We introduce a new measure of the extent of federal regulation in the U.S. and use it to investigate the relationship between federal regulation and macroeconomic performance. We find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on aggregate output and the factors that produce it-total factor productivity (TFP), physical capital, and labor. Regulation has caused substantial reductions in the growth rates of both output and TFP and has had effects on the trends in capital and labor that vary over time in both sign and magnitude. Regulation also affects deviations about the trends in output and its factors of production, and the effects differ across dependent variables. Regulation changes the way output is produced by changing the mix of inputs. Changes in regulation and marginal tax rates offer a straightforward explanation for the productivity slowdown of the 1970s.
Introduction
Macroeconomists typically divide government economic activity into four broad classes: spending, taxation, deficits, and monetary policy. There is, however, a fifth class of activity that may well have important effects on economic activity but that nevertheless has received little attention in the macroeconomic literature: regulation. Although microeconomists have analyzed both the causes and effects of regulation for decades, macroeconomists have joined the discussion only much more recently, with a number of empirical studies suggesting that regulation has significant macroeconomic effects. Goff (1996) apparently was the pioneer, using factor analysis to construct a measure of total regulation in the United States and finding a type of Granger-causality effect of regulation on the path of output. Subsequently, development of several excellent sets of regulation data in cross-sections and panels of countries has led to many new studies of regulation's economic impact; see Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and O. Boylaud (2000) , Nicoletti, Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago, and Swaim (2001) , Bassanini and Ernst (2002) , Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) , Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) , Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho (2005) , and Serven (2004, 2005) for cross-section studies and Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2003) and Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) for panel studies. These studies all conclude that regulation generally has deleterious effects on economic activity.
Existing measures of regulation have two important limitations, however, that restrict their usefulness in quantifying regulation's effects on the time path of the aggregate economy: (1) restriction to a small subset of regulations and (2) a short time dimension. For example, the OECD data set, used in several of the studies cited above, considers only product market and employment protection regulation (Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud, 2000) . The time span of the data ranges from none at all (the cross-section data sets) to a maximum of 20 years (the panel data sets of Kaufman et al., 2003) . Restricting attention to a subset of regulations is problematic because, as we document below, the included regulations often are highly correlated both contemporaneously and intertemporally with the omitted regulations, leading to omitted variables bias in any regression analysis. A short time dimension makes analysis of dynamics difficult or impossible.
We construct a new measure of federal regulation in the US that overcomes these limitations, and we use our measure to analyze the macrodynamic effects of regulation. Our measure includes literally all federal regulations over a period of fifty-seven years. It is complementary to the existing measures, covering different dimensions of the body of regulation and useful for addressing different types of questions. Our measure is designed for time series analysis and thus is particularly well-suited to examining the impact of regulation on macroeconomic dynamics.
We use our series in an equation derived from endogenous growth theory to examine regulation's effect on the time paths of output and total factor productivity (TFP) and secondarily on the paths of labor and capital services. The major effect is on the growth rate of output. We find that regulation added since 1949 has reduced the aggregate growth rate on average by about one percentage point over our sample period. As usual with the compound effect of growth rates, the accumulated effect of a moderate change in the growth rate leads to large effects on the level over time. In particular, our estimates indicate that annual output by 2005 is about 56 percent of what it would have been had regulation remained at its 1949 level. Regulation also affects the dynamic adjustment paths of all variables, altering both the trend and level of each variable and usually having both contemporaneous and lagged effects. The effect of regulation on TFP is especially noteworthy. Increases in regulation, together with changes in marginal tax rates, explain much of the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. Regulation's effects differ for output, TFP, capital, and labor, implying that regulation alters the allocation of resources. Where our findings are comparable with those of previous cross-section and panel studies, they generally are consistent with them. In particular, our estimated growth rate reduction of about one percentage point falls in the middle of the range obtained from the cross-section and panel studies.
Measuring Federal Regulation
Any attempt to construct a measure of regulation will be limited by difficulties that arise from the nature of regulation itself. We explain those difficulties in the first part of this section. We then present our new measure and compare it to previous measures.
Measurement Issues.
When we study the effects of taxes on economic activity, we can appeal to economic theory to tell us which taxes to consider and how those taxes should enter our theoretical or empirical model. For example, theory tells us that one of the ways the income tax affects investment decisions is through the change in the rate of return to investment brought about by the marginal tax rate-that is, it is the marginal tax rate that matters and the channel is through the rate of return. Thus, theory tells us what to measure (the marginal tax rate rather than the average tax rate) and where to put it (in the rate of return). Similarly, when we study the effects of government expenditure on the path of gross domestic product, theory tells us to use the amount of purchases and to decompose it into transitory and permanent parts (Barro, 1981) . Again, we are told what to measure (purchases rather than, say, total expenditure) and how to enter it into the model (decomposed into permanent and transitory parts). Unfortunately, regulation is more difficult to handle. How should one measure the amount of regulation contained in the prohibition "Thou shalt not pollute," and how should it enter a macroeconomic model? As we shall see, modern growth theory actually does give us some guide into how to address the latter modeling issue, but it does not tell us exactly what to measure. There is no "marginal regulation rate" in either the theory or any available data. There also is no market in which regulations are traded, so there is no market price indicating their value. We thus unavoidably are limited to some kind of counting measure of the volume of regulation. A counting measure obviously is imperfect in that two identical values may comprise regulations of different types and, even within a given type, may have regulations of different stringency. However, if there are many kinds of regulation (as in fact there are in all countries included in regulation studies), it is reasonable to expect an index to provide a useful overall measure of regulation. In that regard, measures of regulation are no different from many other variables.
Government purchases, physical capital, schooling, labor, and so on are composites whose effects may vary with the composition even though two reported values may be the same.
There is an indirect indicator that counting measures of regulation contain useful information, which is the results that arise from including them in regressions. If the measures contained no information, they should not be systematically related to dependent variables of interest. In fact, they routinely have coefficients that are both statistically significant and of the sign predicted by theory. For example, regulations that make it costly to start a business should be negatively associated with investment. That is exactly what has been found (Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli, 2003) .
The measures of regulation mentioned in the Introduction generally proceed by constructing indices based on binary indicators of whether or not various kinds of regulation exist, assigning a value of 1 to each type of regulation that exists and a 0 to those that do not exist. The index then is constructed as a weighted sum of all the binary indicators. Such measures capture the existence of given types of regulation but cannot capture their extent or complexity. Some measures therefore add indicators of the extent or effectiveness of regulation (see, for example, the detailed Annex in Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud, 2000) . The measure we propose is an alternative counting measure that is not binary and that captures at least some of the complexity of regulation. Specifically, our measure is the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (hereafter, CFR). Although other researchers have proposed related measures, ours is more precise and covers a much longer time span.
1 The CFR contains literally every federal regulation in existence during a given year, and it has a time span of more than 50 years. It thus is more comprehensive and covers a much longer time span than previous measures of regulation. Because all federal regulations must be published in the CFR, our page count measure must have at least a rough correlation with the "true" amount of regulation that should enter an economic model. If the CFR page count were zero, there would be no regulation, and it surely is reasonable to suppose that the more pages there are in the CFR, the more regulations there are. It also seems reasonable to suppose that the number of pages is positively related to the complexity of regulation because, at least on average, more complex regulations should require more pages to describe. In that case, our measure captures more than just the existence of a regulation.
We next provide a brief description of the Code of Federal Regulations, the measure of regulation we extract from it, and a brief comparison of our measure with predecessors. A more complete discussion appears in the Appendix.
Brief History of the CFR
The CFR contains all regulations issued by the federal government. It was first published in 1938 and was divided into 50 "titles," each pertaining to a major division of regulation, such as agriculture, banking, environment, labor, and shipping. The structure of 50 titles continues to this day. The second complete edition of the CFR was published in 1949. Annual supplements were published between 1938 and 1949, listing changes in regulations.
Because of the way the annual supplements were done, it is difficult to use them to update the 1938 edition of the CFR to obtain annual page counts. After 1949, pocket supplements replaced the annual supplements, and updated versions of entire titles were published increasingly often. The pocket supplements were done differently than the annual supplements; together with the intermittent revised titles, they make it possible to construct annual page 2 See the Appendix for details on the method of construction. Note in particular that we have accounted for changes in typeface and page sizes. 2 Starting in 1969, the complete CFR has been published annually. Periods of negative growth are infrequent, and, when they do occur, the absolute value of the growth rate is small.
Overview of the CFR Page Count Series
By far, the fastest percentage growth occurred in the early 1950s. High growth also occurred in the 1970s, even though there was extensive deregulation in transportation, telecommunications, and energy. Deregulation in that period was more than offset by increased regulation in other areas, notably pertaining to the environment and occupational safety, as Hopkins (1991) 
Comparison with Other Measures of Regulation
We present a brief comparison with earlier measures of regulation, restricting attention here to the two most important differences: the time span of the data and the comprehensiveness of the regulations included. A complete 3 The predecessors are Nicoletti G. , S. Scarpetta, and O. Boylaud (2000) , Nicoletti, Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago, and Swaim (2001) , Bassanini and Ernst (2002) , Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) , Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) , Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho (2005) , Serven (2004, 2005) , Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2003) and Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) . 6 discussion of all the differences between our measure and its predecessors is in the Appendix.
3
Our measure spans 57 years. The earlier measures have short to non-existent time spans, the longest being 20 years and the shortest 1 year. The earlier measures cannot be used to study regulation's effects on dynamic adjustment paths, which requires following the evolution of variables through time. There is more hope of studying regulation's effects on average growth rates by using the cross-sectional dimension of the data to overcome the inadequate time dimension, but even there one must proceed with caution in light of Ventura's (1997) demonstration that the interpretation of cross-country growth regressions is confounded by the effects of international trade. Longrun growth and dynamic adjustment are intertemporal phenomena, best studied with time-series data. Our measure is naturally suited to studying them. The earlier measures, with their strong cross-section element but weak intertemporal element, are better suited for cross-sectional issues.
Our measure includes literally every regulation issued by the federal government, which makes it far more comprehensive than any of its predecessors. For example, the most widely used of the earlier data sets is the OECD cross-section measure described by and extended in part to a 20-year panel by . The original OECD cross-section data are restricted to product market and employment protection regulation. Other types of regulation, such as environmental or occupational health and safety regulation, are ignored. The panel extension is restricted further to a small subset of seven non-manufacturing industries: gas, electricity, post, telecommunications, passenger air transport, railways and road freight. Furthermore, within this restricted set of industries, only a few types of regulations are included, varying by industry: barriers to entry (available for all industries), public ownership (all industries except road freight), vertical integration (only gas, electricity and railways), market structure (only gas, telecommunications and railways), and price controls (only road freight). Incomplete coverage leads to two problems: (1) omitted variables bias, and, in any time series study, (2) divergence between the time series behavior of subsets of regulation on the one hand and of total regulation on the other. Table 1 shows that the contemporaneous correlations of the various titles of the CFR are often quite high. 4 Table 2 shows that the intertemporal cross-correlations also are quite high. Such high correlations imply that including just one type of regulation in a statistical analysis is likely to be misleading because of multicollinearity and omitted variables bias. As a particular example, consider Nicoletti et al.'s (2001) measure, which the authors interpret as "a proxy for the overall regulatory policies followed by OECD countries over the sample period" (p. 43). A final issue concerns the burden of regulation and the vigor of enforcement. Our measure controls for regulatory burden to some extent. The OECD data set measures regulatory burden by the presence or absence of a long list of regulatory requirements. It seems reasonable to suppose that the number of pages required to describe regulatory requirements varies directly with the number of requirements, on average at the very least. Our page count measure therefore should capture whatever regulatory burden is reflected in the number of regulatory requirements. In fact, our approach may give a more complete picture of regulatory burden than the OECD's measure because page counts indicate not only the presence or absence of particular provisions (a zero-one variable) but also their complexity (a continuous variable up to the inherent discreteness of numerical page counts), again on the reasonable assumption that more complex regulations require more pages of description. Another useful dimension of regulatory burden to measure would be the vigor with which regulations are enforced, but we were not able to find anything suitable. We considered using court cases or enforcement budgets, but we could find no useable data. Omitting vigor of enforcement is a problem only if enforcement vigor is correlated with the amount of regulation itself, but we see in the historical record no reason to expect such a correlation. For example, the amount of regulation fell during the Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton administrations, but none of those administrations was considered to be lax in the enforcement of the regulations that remained. Moreover, regulatory enforcement is conducted by quasi-independent regulatory commissions, at least partly insulated from political pressures. We therefore proceed on the assumption that variation in enforcement vigor is orthogonal to variation in the amount of regulation.
In summary, our page count measure has a much longer time span and much more comprehensive coverage than any other measure. It is well-suited to analyzing the effects of regulation on the dynamic behavior of the aggregate economy.
Theory
We divide theories of regulation into two categories: micro and macro, which we discuss separately.
Microeconomic Theory of Regulation
The microeconomic theory of regulation also divides into two types: those about the effects of regulation and those about its origins. A full discussion of either is far beyond the scope of the present paper and also unnecessary for our purposes, so we present only the briefest of summaries.
Even at the micro level, regulation's effects on economic activity often are not straightforward. For example, regulating the rate of return earned by public utilities seemingly should make the utility less profitable and so reduce its capital stock. However, in a well-known article, Averch and Johnson (1962) show that capital may rise. Even when regulation's effect on a firm is clear, the effect on the market often is not. Smokestack emission regulations may require a firm to invest in new capital, implying that capital should rise in response to the regulation, but some firms may close in the face of the new regulatory costs, reducing capital. The net effect on aggregate capital is ambiguous. Effects on production costs and thus output are even more difficult to predict. Effluent regulations increase the cost of business for the polluter and reduce his output but have the opposite effects on producers downstream. Again, the aggregate output effect is ambiguous. Moreover, types of regulation interact with each other and with the market structure of the regulated industry, typically leading to ambiguous effects. See Alesina et al. (2003) for a more extended discussion. Regulatory effects on labor also are complex; see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for one treatment.
The origins of regulation are studied in a branch of the public choice literature. Djankov et al. (2002) present an excellent discussion of the literature, which we quickly summarize here. Pigou (1938) argues that regulation arises from government's attempt to improve social welfare by correcting market failures. Stigler (1971) proposes a much less benign theory of regulatory capture, in which the regulated firms gain control of the regulatory agency and use it to their advantage. McChesney (1987) 
Regulation and the Macroeconomy
We are aware of no theory that addresses the effects that regulation has on the macroeconomy. Fortunately, however, recent work by Peretto (2007a Peretto ( , 2007b Peretto ( , 2007c Peretto ( , 2008 In contrast, variety expansion has only level and transition effects, not permanent growth effects, because of fixed costs (Peretto and Connolly, 2007) . Also, there is no scale effect because an increased population stimulates entry of new intermediate goods firms, which then must absorb resources to conduct R&D on the new varieties of intermediate goods.
7 One relevant detail is the nature of government purchases. Equation (1) is based on the assumption that the government sets the tax rates and adjusts purchases to satisfy the government budget constraint. If instead the government sets purchases and adjusts tax rates, a somewhat different form arises. As we discuss below, evidence on the behavior of government expenditures and tax rates suggests that equation (1) is the right form to use. 8 For example, the intercept term A(t L ) in Peretto (2007a) is the simplest of the three functions and has the form:
which is neither linear nor log-linear in t L or even 1-t L . The functions B(.) and C(.) are far more complicated. (1)
The various taxes have different effects on the path of Y: labor taxes affect the intercept but not the growth rate; corporate income, dividend, and capital gains taxes do just the opposite; all four of those taxes affect the transition path; and the consumption tax has no effects at all on the path of output. Similarly, the model parameters R, 2, ", $, N, (, D, and 0 enter the three functions in different ways. Peretto provides closed-form solutions for all three of the functions A, B, and T, with the specific forms depending on the details of the model. 7 In all cases, the functions are irreducibly non-linear and mostly quite complicated. 8 Peretto (2008) finds substantial quantitative effects of taxes on growth rates and social welfare.
Two important things that we learn from equation (1) are the overall form for output as a function of time and the way that taxes and model parameters affect output's time path. First, output is stationary about an exponential trend, not difference stationary. Changes in trend appear as breaks, not random shocks to a differencestationary process. The consensus among macroeconometricians for some time has been that the best model of the non-stationarity of aggregate data is precisely this kind of log-linear trend with breaks (Perron, 1989; Lumsdaine and 9 Fractional integration models have been shown to be observationally equivalent to trend-break models (Diebold and Inoue, 2001) . 10 The probability of dying affects the rate of time preference in the household choice model extended to include random time of death. See Blanchard (1985) .
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Papell, 1997; Murray and Nelson, 2000) . 9 Thus equation (1) dovetails nicely with current econometric practice, although it differs slightly from the standard trend-break models in the econometrics literature in that it offers at least a partial explanation of trend breaks as consequences of government policy changes rather than as purely unexplained random phenomena. Second, equation (1) tells us which taxes enter each of the three terms on the right side of the equation. We will use these results in formulating our estimating equation.
In Peretto's models, taxes act by altering various net rates of return and so appear in the model as modifications of some of the underlying parameters. Regulation will enter the model in the same way, that is, by altering net rates of return and thus modifying underlying parameters. As with taxes, exactly how regulation enters the model depends on the specific regulation. For example, regulations that raise the cost of keeping employees, such as regulations on safety and retirement benefits, affect employment in a way qualitatively similar to Social Security taxes, which are a type of income tax. Other regulations can affect parameters in ways that taxes do not.
There are seven fundamental parameters in equation (1) Title 49: Transportation), the elasticity " of labor augmentation with respect to public knowledge (e.g., Title 37:
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights), entry costs $ (e.g., Title 16: Commercial Practices), and fixed cost N (e.g., 
where R t is our measure of regulation. Regulation has three distinct types of effects: (I) level effects through the intercept term A(.), (ii) growth rate (or trend) effects through the exponent B(.), and (iii) transition dynamic effects through the term C(.). We will estimate a version of equation (2) so that we can measure these three effects.
Estimation
We begin our empirical investigation with a discussion of the variables to be examined and then turn to the econometric analysis.
Variables To Be Examined
We want to study the effect that federal regulation has on macroeconomic activity. As noted earlier, regulation grows most of the time, but there is great variation in the growth rate. That variation allows us to perform tests of the relation between regulation and the other variables. The obvious macroeconomic variable to examine is real aggregate output, and indeed that is the focus of our study. However, regulation presumably affects the economy in complex ways. It therefore seems worthwhile to examine how regulation affects not just output but also the determinants of output. If we suppose a Cobb-Douglas production function, then output Y t is given by where D t is total factor productivity (hereafter, TFP), K t is capital services, and N t is labor services. In what follows, we examine how regulation affects D, K, and N as well as Y.
Data
Regulatory activity (R) is the total page count of the CFR, discussed above. Real output in the private business sector (Y), private capital service flows (K), and hours of labor services (N) are from the Monthly Labor
Review. Output (Y) is real output in the private business sector, which is gross domestic product less output produced by the government, private households, and non-profit institutions. Capital (K) is service flows of equipment, structures, inventories, and land, computed as a Tornqvist aggregate of capital stocks using rental prices as weights. Labor (N) is hours worked by all persons in the private business sector, computed as a Tornqvist aggregate of hours of all persons using hourly compensation as weights. TFP is the Solow residual from a CobbDouglas production function assuming a capital share of thirty percent. We include two explanatory variables other than regulation: total government purchases (G) and the federal marginal tax rate on personal income (T).
Government purchases is the sum of government consumption and government investment and is from NIPA. The marginal tax rate is from Stephenson (1998) and includes both the federal personal income tax and the Social Security tax. Although theory suggests different roles for different taxes, as shown in equation (2) Stephenson's measure of the effective marginal income tax rate seems a reasonable proxy for "the" tax rate. We thus replace the four separate tax rates t L , t B , t D , and t V in equation (2) 
Granger Causality Tests
In the spirit of Hamilton's (1983) pioneering study of oil and the macroeconomy, we begin with the completely non-structural method of Granger causality tests. Table 3 reports the results of bivariate Grangercausality tests between regulation and each of the macroeconomic variables for the period 1949-2005 using 4 lags.
The tests are conducted on the first-differences of the logs in order to have stationary variables. Lower case variables denote the logs of the corresponding upper case variables. The notation )r÷ / )x refers to the test that )r does not Granger-cause )x. The tests indicate unidirectional causality from R to Y and TFP, no causality in either direction between R and N, and marginally significant causality from K to R. The causality from K to R is insignificant at 3 or 5 lags, so we treat it as insignificant.
Hamilton (1983) concluded on the basis of similar Granger causality tests that oil prices played a major role in causing movements in US aggregate output. If we were to stop here, we would draw a similar conclusion about regulation. 11 Rather than stop, however, we continue with an examination of reduced-form regressions to explore in more detail the relations suggested by our Granger causality tests. 
Regression Models
Our main empirical analysis is based on estimation of a version of equation (2). We begin with an explanation of how we use equation (2) to formulate a tractable estimating equation and then present our results. We then briefly discuss some alternative estimation approaches and the results we obtained.
4.4.A. The Regression Model.
As remarked above, we use a trend-break model derived from endogenous growth theory for our estimation. We cannot use equation (2) directly for two reasons: (i) equation (2) assumes that the nature of each tax can be precisely specified (tax on labor income, tax on dividends, etc.), whereas our regulation data do not permit such precise specification for regulations (e.g., "environmental" regulations affect workplace safety, work practices, business practices, the cost of new capital, and so on), and (ii) equation (2) assumes taxes are proportional and observed, whereas we have good data on only the federal income tax, which is highly non-linear tax. Thus our measures of taxes and regulation will not enter the three functions A(.), B(.), and C(.) in equation (2) in the same way as the separate tax rates. We therefore must approximate those functions.
We start with the following equation:
where: X is any of our dependent macro variables Y, TFP, K, or N; Z is an exogenous explanatory variable for X (such as R, T, or G); ", $, ( j , * j , and T j are constants (note that we are reusing several Greek letters here with 13 That is, a model of the form . different meanings than they had earlier in the theory section); J i are lag lengths; and U is a log-normally distributed residual. Generalization to the case where Z is a vector is straightforward.
The first term in parentheses in equation (3) is a trend term. The trend coefficient is a quadratic function of Z. The quadratic is simple and suffices for this first attempt at exploring the theoretically non-linear causal relation between regulation and trend breaks. It has some undesirable implications for extrapolation beyond the sample period, as we discuss below, so further research on functional forms for the trend coefficient would be useful. Note that (3) nests the simpler linearly detrended model with constant trend (( i = 0, * j = 0 for all I, j). 13 The second large term in parentheses in (3) is a combination of the intercept and cycle terms A(.) and C(.) in equation (2) that we explain in more detail presently.
Equation (3) is the form we use for estimation. It is not quite in the same form as equation (2), the growth equation that motivates it, because Z may contain a trend of its own. Equation (2) collects all trend elements in the single term B(.). It is easy to see, however, that equations (2) and (3) are equivalent by decomposing Z into its trend and cycle components and then combining the trend component with the first term in parentheses in (3) to obtain a total trend term. We suppose Z obeys where " Z and $ Z are constants, with $ Z being the trend in Z, and V is a log-normally distributed residual that is the variation about the trend. Substituting into (3) and doing some straightforward algebra gives (4) where A = exp("+" Z ET-$ Z EjT j ) and C = (AV t-j. T )U t . Equation (4) has the same form as equation (2).
The first term A in (4) is a constant. The second term is the trend with trend coefficient B(
. The first term inside B(Z t ) is the constant $, which captures trend elements apart from any 14 The U component of the compound residual can include any exogenous variable not subject to analysis. The trends in such variables are included in the trend-apart term $, so that U captures the transient components.
18 effects of Z. In particular, it would be the trend in X if Z were held constant, a fact we use in the analysis below.
The last three terms in B(Z t ) collect the various effects of Z on the trend in X. In what follows, we refer to the first term $ as the trend-apart effect (because it captures the trend that would be present if all the exogenous variables were trendless), the second term $ Z ET j as the trend-intercept effect of Z, the third term as the trend-linear effect, and the fourth term as the trend-quadratic effect. The trend-intercept effect is constant. Below, we discuss counterfactual paths that would have emerged if exogenous variables had been held constant. Doing that requires distinguishing among the quantities $, T$ Z , and $+T$ Z . The third term in (4) consists of the compound residual, U(AV T ) and is the cycle term. It corresponds to C(.) in equation (2). Because X is trend-stationary, the compound residual is purely transient, causing fluctuations about trend. The term AV T captures the part of the residual due to Z's deviation from its trend. We call this transient component the cycle effect. 14 When Z equals its "normal" (or balanced growth) value, there is no transient effect, V t-j = 1 for all j, and the only remaining level effect arises from the intercept term .
Transition dynamics appear in two places in equation (4): the lagged values of the explanatory variables included in the growth rate and the lagged values included in the cycle effect. The balanced growth rate is the value of the growth rate in (4) when Z is constant. When Z changes, the balanced growth rate also changes, causing transition dynamics in going from the old balanced growth path to the new one. Changes in Z induce additional transition dynamics through the cycle effect. The cycle effect captures movements about a given growth path. The same type of distinction appears in discrete-time ARIMA models in which a variable's level has a growth term and a random term, and the growth term itself is stochastic with a random term, such as Both u t and v t cause transition dynamics. The growth term that appears in the transition dynamics here was absent from equation (2). It arises from time variation in the regulation and tax parameters which were treated as constant in equation (2). Peretto (2007a) restricted his analysis to an economy that starts off the balanced growth path (and therefore has transition dynamics) but that has constant values for all policy parameters. In contrast, we must allow changes in the policy parameters to capture the variation in regulation and taxes over our sample period, so we also must include the growth term in the transition dynamics.
4.4.B. Explanatory Variables and Exogeneity.
We examine the sensitivity of our endogenous macro variables to three policy variables R, G, and T; that is, the variable Z in (1) is the vector (R, G, T ) and the parameters (, *, and T are also vectors. We have not pursued the possibility of decomposing G into major parts (such as federal versus state and local, or national defense versus road building), even though different kinds of expenditure almost certainly have different effects on the economy and may interact with regulation in different ways. Similarly, we ignore government debt, which is the correct procedure under the assumption of Ricardian equivalence. Most of the empirical investigations of regulation cited earlier ignore G and T. We find that inclusion of T has large quantitative (but not qualitative) effects on the estimates of regulation's macroeconomic impact.
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Before we can proceed to estimation, we must determine whether the explanatory variables are econometrically exogenous. The Granger-causality tests for R, discussed above, show no causality running from any of the dependent variables to R, implying exogeneity of R. We performed additional Granger-causality tests (not reported) of the exogeneity of G and T. The tests stabilize at about 4 lags and indicate statistical exogeneity of T at the 5% level. In contrast, G frequently appears to be endogenous, with causality never running from G to the macro variables of interest but frequently running from them to G. These results are consistent with government setting tax rates and then choosing G to satisfy the government budget constraint. In light of these results, we treat R and T as exogenous. Exploration of regressions that included G showed no important differences from regressions that omitted it, so henceforth we ignore G. (3), we obtain the following equation for the evolution of X:
17 We tried two other estimation methods. Instead of using a Newey-West correction, we estimated subject to the following ARMA model for u t :
where e is white noise. The results were essentially the same as those with the Newey-West correction. We also tried choosing lag lengths by dropping lag terms until we arrived at one that was individually significant. Again, the main conclusions were unchanged.
(5)
The estimating equation is obtained by taking the natural log of (5): (6) Note that equation (6) derives from a coherent theory of endogenous growth. It contains no lagged dependent variables because the underlying theory does not predict the presence of such variables, as shown in equation (2). It also is not a VAR. VARs usually can be considered as linear approximations to a poorly understood theoretical model, useful when the theory provides little guidance on the correct specification. In contrast, we have a welldeveloped theory providing a closed-form solution. We must approximate that solution because of the data limitations discussed above, but our approximations preserve the basic structure emerging from the theory, which does not include a lagged dependent variable.
In estimating (6), we chose the lag lengths J x by imposing an initial value of 3 on all the J x and searching, subject to two restrictions, over all possible smaller values to find that which minimized the Schwarz-Bayes Criterion (SBC). The restrictions on the search procedure were (1) the constant always was retained and (2) no variable could be omitted unless all of its more-lagged values also were omitted. For example, even if the lowest SBC value was obtained with a model that excluded Z t but retained Z t-1 , that model was not considered. Exclusion of Z t would be allowed only if Z t-1 also was excluded. The reason for imposing this restriction was that, with annual data, it did not seem reasonable to suppose that a variable could have an effect only with a one-period lag. The residuals were serially correlated, so we used a Newey-West correction.
17 Table 4 2 +2R t )R t +(R t ) 2 , multiply by the appropriate estimated trend coefficients (( and *), and collect all terms containing )R t . Similarly, in the cycle term we replace R t with R 1949 (R t /R 1949 ), raise to appropriate estimated power (T), and collect all terms involving ratios of the form (R t /R 1949 )
T . Finally, dividing actual output by the trend arising from the terms containing )R t and by the cycle components (R t /R 1949 )
T is equivalent to setting )R to zero and (R t /R 1949 )
T to one, thus giving a counterfactual value of output under the restriction that regulation remained 21 space Table 4 is restricted to those lags that had significant coefficients in at least one equation.
Regulation has significant effects on all four dependent macro variables, entering with both trend and cycle terms. In some cases regulation enters with lags, indicating dynamic responses in the dependent variables. Also, the coefficient patterns and magnitudes differ across dependent variables, indicating compositional effects. As we have seen above, regulation can have two kinds of effects on a dependent variable's trend: a shift in the trend (the trendintercept effect) and breaks in trend (the trend-linear and trend-quadratic effects). Our results indicate that both kinds of effects are present. The trend-intercept effect is the product of regulation's trend $ R and the sum of the T j R coefficients. The latter are reported in Table 4 , and the former is obtained by estimating the equation r t = " R + $ R t + < t . The estimated value of $ R is 0.0322. Estimating the analogous equation for the tax rate gives a trend in T of 0.0058.
4.4.C.1: Output.
For output, there is only one T j R coefficient, whose value is -0.406. Its product with $ R is -0.013, indicating that regulation shifts the trend in output down by one and a third percentage points. That shift, being a reduction in the intercept of the trend coefficient function B(R t ), is uniform over time. In addition, regulation has time-varying effects on output's trend through the trend-linear and trend-quadratic terms of the coefficient function B(R t ). The sum of trend-linear coefficients is positive, causing output's trend to rise on net as regulation grows, and the trend-quadratic coefficient is negative, indicating that the trend-quadratic effect is negative and causes output's trend to fall as regulation grows. We thus have a non-linear effect of regulation on output's trend. Figure 5 shows the total effects of regulation on output's trend over time. The effect is always negative but is nonlinear. Growth in regulation raised output's trend (that is, made it less negative) until about 1980 and then reduced it. The average value of the negative effect is 0.008, or eight-tenths of a percentage point.
The large negative value of T 0 indicates that regulation also has a substantial cycle effect on output. We can determine the total effect of the trend and cycle terms by using the parameter estimates and regulation data to calculate a counterfactual value of output that would have obtained had regulation stayed at its 1949 level.
at its 1949 level. A large effect of regulation on economic growth also is consistent with the calibration results of Parente and Prescott (1999) . They analyze general "barriers to riches," but regulations constitute a large element of such barriers. Indeed, their Chapters 6 and 7 are almost exclusively about barriers imposed by regulations. Their calibration results find that such barriers explain most of the large cross-country differences in both levels and growth rates of income per person.
4.4.C.2. Opportunity Cost of Regulation.
Attempts in the literature to measure the cost of regulation have been confined to compliance cost. The estimates are large. For example, Crain and Hopkins (2001) estimate the cost of 19 This 8 percent excludes the cost of tax compliance, which Crain and Hopkins included. We exclude tax compliance cost because taxes generally are not considered regulations. Tax compliance cost amounts to about one half of one percent of GDP. 20 Of course, because we have restricted our functional form to a quadratic, ridiculous results can be obtained by extrapolating far beyond the sample period. If regulation continues to grow, the negative terms take over and eventually output growth becomes negative, driving output toward zero as time passes. Such behavior obviously would not be tolerated by society, and the process governing the evolution of regulation would change. The problem is exactly the same as using a quadratic utility function to approximate the true function: it can work quite well locally but will give nonsensical results if abused. These problems of extrapolation are not relevant to our discussion here, which is confined to behavior within the sample period. 19 Our results suggest another element of cost that has not been considered previously: the opportunity cost arising from reduced GDP. The magnitude is many times larger than the compliance cost. Three other aspects of the output opportunity cost are noteworthy. First, our figures are net costs. They are based on the change in total product caused by regulation and so include positive as well as negative effects. Our results thus indicate that whatever positive effects regulation may have on measured output are outweighed by the negative effects. Second, our measure does not include any non-production benefits of regulation. The nonproduction benefits could be both large and growing. Pollution, for example, presumably grows as unregulated industrialization expands. The cost of pollution may grow non-linearly. Those costs have been reduced by environmental regulation, and if regulation has reduced the growth rate of pollution, then it correspondingly has introduced a growing benefit that is not included in measured output. We do not attempt to measure such benefits here, confining our analysis strictly to measured output. Consequently, we emphasize that our results offer no conclusion on whether regulation is a net social benefit. 21 They do, however, make clear that the cost of regulation is substantial and must be taken seriously in any evaluation of regulation's net social benefit. Third, our estimated opportunity cost pertains only to regulation added since 1949. We have no way to measure the opportunity cost associated with regulation up to 1949. It seems certain that some regulation has a negative opportunity cost, that is, a net positive effect on GDP. Surely GDP would be lower in the absence of traffic regulations or organized patent procedures. However, most of those most basic regulations were in place well before 1949, so for our work their benefits are simply a given impounded in the intercept. We can use our parameter estimates to quantify this impressionistic visual analysis. The second column of Table 4 reports the TFP estimates. Using those in the same way as we did for output, we can calculate the effects of regulation and taxes on TFP. Figure 9 shows the effect of regulation on TFP's trend. The effect is negative throughout the sample period, but there is sharp increase in the steepness of the slope in the early 1970s, corresponding to the large increase in environmental and occupational, health, and safety regulation. Figure 10 shows the change in the ratio of actual TFP to counterfactual TFP obtained by holding regulation at its 1949 level.
4.4.C.3: TFP and the Productivity
As with output, there is an initial point artifact. Ignoring that, we see that the change in the ratio is about zero in 1965 and then becomes increasingly negative until about 1980. After that, the change rises gradually until about 1998, after which it falls again. Throughout the period after 1965, the change is negative, indicating a persistent (though far from constant) negative effect of regulation on TFP.
Taxes also play a role in explaining TFP growth. Figure 11 plots the change in the ratio of actual TFP to counterfactual TFP obtained by holding the marginal tax rate at its 1949 level. Ignoring the usual initial point artifact, we see that the graph turns downward in about 1965, which is about the start of the productivity slowdown.
The graph turns slightly upward around 1975 and then sharply upward around 1996.
Changes in regulation and taxes reinforce each other in their effects on the path of TFP in the mid-1960s
and late 1970s. They oppose each other after about 1998, leading to a flat path for TFP after that date. Figure 12 shows the combined effects of regulation and taxes on TFP, plotting the change in the ratio of actual TFP to counterfactual TFP obtained by holding both the level of regulation and the marginal tax rate at their 1949 values.
Comparing Figure 12 with Figure 8 , which plots the growth rate of TFP over the sample period, shows a close match in the slopes and turning points, suggesting that regulation and the marginal tax rate explain a great deal of the changes in TFP's path, including the productivity slowdown.
The foregoing explanation of the productivity slowdown has an important advantage over alternatives in the literature. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) offer an explanation of the productivity slowdown based on the idea that the economy underwent severe adjustment difficulties in adapting to the large amount of investment expenditure on information technology that began in the late 1970s. Nordhaus (2004) suggests that the productivity slowdown resulted from the OPEC oil shock of the early 1970s. Though both mechanisms may have had a role to play, they cannot be the entire story because the productivity slowdown started five to ten years earlier than either the technology investment or oil shock in the 1970s. In contrast, as we have seen, significant changes in both regulation and marginal tax rates occurred at the start of the productivity slowdown in the mid-1960s and then again at the slowdown's end around 1980.
4.4.C.4: Capital and Labor.
We do not dwell on the results for capital and labor because they are of secondary interest and are generally of the same character as those for output and TFP. See the last two columns in Table 4 . In particular, regulation has significant effects on both variables, has both growth and cyclical effects, has both linear and non-linear effects on the growth terms, and enters with lags. The pattern of coefficients for labor is very similar to the pattern for output, but the pattern for capital is quite different from those for all the other dependent variables.
The different patterns across the three inputs means that changes in regulation causes shifts in the relative amounts of inputs used to produce a given amount of output. Regulation affects not only output's path but also the way output is produced. 
4.4.C.5: Consistency with

Other Models Explored.
We explored a few other models. First, we tried a difference-stationary ARMA model, extended to allow a time-varying drift rate: 22 (7) .
As in the trend-break model, Z is the vector (R, T) and the coefficients ( and * also are vectors. The patterns and joint significance tests of the coefficient estimates led to similar conclusions as those in the trend-break model. Furthermore, this model is inferior to equation (6) in that it loses an economically important piece of information.
Equation (7) is the discrete-time analog to the first-difference of the log of equation (2). Taking the first-difference of the log eliminates the intercept term A(.). That is a major loss of information because A(.) captures the level effects of regulation.
We also explored cointegration among variables and the possibility of estimating an error-correction model. 23 Note that disaggregation by title is not the same as disaggregation by industry affected, nor does it necessarily capture all regulations of a general type. "Agriculture" and "Animals and Animal Products" are separate titles that both affect the agriculture industry. "Banks and Banking" is a title that may affect many industries. For some purposes, it might be preferable to measure some group of related regulations, such as all regulations pertaining to agriculture. This is the approach taken in some of the literature cited in the Introduction.
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The results were uninformative. Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1991 tests indicate the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors among the variables Y, N, K, R, G, and T. This result suggests a long-run relationship exists between these variables, but interpretation of individual parameter estimates is unclear in the case of multiple cointegrating vectors. In addition, the number of cointegrating vectors is sensitive to assumptions about lag lengths, trends in the underlying data, the choice of variables included in the analysis, and the inclusion of constant and trend terms in the cointegrating relations themselves, making the choice between alternative models largely arbitrary. These results are not surprising if regulation affects the aggregate economy in the highly nonlinear fashion suggested by our trendbreak model, for cointegration presumes a linear relation.
Furthermore, both the difference-stationary model and cointegration framework require the individual series to be unit-root processes. Although Phillips-Perron tests fail to reject the unit-root hypothesis in the series under examination, it is well known that conventional unit-root tests often fail to reject the unit-root null when the true data generating process is trend-break stationary (Perron, 1989) . The underlying aggregate variables being trend-break stationary (as is the current consensus among macroeconomists) would be another reason for the poor performance of the difference-stationary and cointegration models.
Finally, we tried to isolate the CFR titles with significant impacts on our aggregate dependent variables. 23 However, the large number of titles leaves us too few degrees of freedom to obtain useful results. We could not include any lags. For each possible dependent variable, a small subset of the titles had coefficients individually significant at the 10 percent level or less. However, a joint test of the remaining titles always strongly rejected the null that the remaining titles were jointly insignificant, implying that at least some of the individually insignificant titles are in fact significant. We thus could exclude no individual title and so could not identify which individual titles were significant for any dependent variable.
Conclusion
We have presented a new time series measuring the extent of federal regulation in the United States, and we have used it to examine the effect of regulation on the macro dynamics of several aggregate variables of interest.
We find that post-1949 regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on the time paths of output, total factor productivity, labor, and physical capital. Regulation alters both trends and movements about the trends.
The trend effects usually are complex and non-linear. The cycle effects have lag lengths and coefficient sign patterns that differ across the dependent variables. Regulation has allocative effects, changing the mix of factors used to produce output.
Regulation's overall effect on output's growth rate is negative and substantial. Federal regulations added over the past fifty years have reduced real output growth by about one percentage point on average over the period 1949-2005. The main channel through which regulation has reduced output is TFP. We find that federal regulation, together with changes in marginal tax rates, can explain much of the famous and famously puzzling productivity slowdown of the 1970s.
Our results are generally consistent with those obtained from studies using the various cross-country and panel data sets on regulation. The latter are constructed very differently from our data set, covering a subset of total regulations but over an array of countries. That the results agree qualitatively and even quantitatively suggests they are robust.
Stephenson, E.F., 1998, "Average Marginal Tax Notes: The variables are: r (regulation), y (output), tfp (total factor productivity), k (physical capital), n (labor), where lower case letters denote the natural logs of the variables in question. ) is the first difference operator; q is the number of lagged variables in the estimated equation; N is the number of observations. R=R(1949) , T=T(1949) 24 Throughout the appendix, the following citation format is used: volume or title number followed by name of publication followed by page or section number. Regulations, respectively, except that the former are primarily concerned with the publication and codification of laws, whereas the later are concerned with transmitting to the public written requirements to be carried out and enforced by government agencies (i.e., regulations). Thus, the CFR is more appropriate than the U.S. Code as a measure of regulation. 26 No supplement was published for 1942. 27 Due to the imminence of the second edition of the CFR, no supplement was issued for 1948. Regulatory changes published in the FR during 1948 were codified for the first time in the 1949 edition of the Code.
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Appendix: Code of Federal Regulations
History and Background of the Code of Federal Regulations
Before 1935, no systematic process existed for the promulgation of federal regulations; regulations were simply typed and filed by individual agencies. The lack of public notification regarding regulatory activity later came to be known as "hip pocket" law, which led the government to embarrassment in Panama Refining Company v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388, 1935) , also known as the "Hot Oil Case."
24 The government's case, which was based on a provision that was later nullified by a subsequent regulation, was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and both parties in the case were impugned for their ignorance of the law. This outcome led to the Federal Register Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 500; 44 USC Chapter 15), which established a consistent framework for codification of government regulations throughout the rulemaking process.
The Federal Register (FR), first published on March 14, 1936, is a daily publication in which proposed regulations appear first in draft form and eventually in final form, if passed into law. The FR also contains presidential proclamations, executive orders, announcements of agency hearings and meetings on regulatory issues, grant application instructions and deadlines, official agency decisions and actions, and agency establishments, reorganizations, and dissolutions. Sometimes, there also are long sections containing technical or economic analyses or discussion of issues arising during consideration of a proposed regulation. The final regulations (newly passed into law) contained in the FR ultimately are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Divided into 50 subject categories called titles, the structure of the CFR is similar, but not identical, to that of the United States Code. Currently, each title of the CFR is revised annually and contains all regulations in effect as of the cover date.
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The first edition of the CFR published regulations in force as of June 1, 1938. In the early years, the CFR was not revised annually. Instead, annual supplements carried in full text all changes and additions to the 1938 edition of the CFR as published in the FR. The supplements covered the periods June 2-December 31, 1938 and subsequent calendar years through 1941, listing regulatory changes promulgated during the period and in effect on December 31 of the year in question. 26 The first revision of the CFR, scheduled for June 1, 1943 under the Federal Register Act, was postponed because of the volume of rapidly changing regulations related to World War II and the preoccupation of all government agencies with the war effort. In its place, a cumulative supplement to the 1938 edition of the CFR compiled regulations in force as of June 1, 1943. However, regulations in effect at that date whose text was identical to that in the 1938 edition of the CFR are included only by reference to the original CFR. Also, emergency controls associated with the war period are recorded by tabulation rather than codification in the cumulative supplement. Thus, the cumulative supplement served as an adjunct to the original edition rather than a replacement of it. Following the cumulative supplement, annual supplements continued to update the 1938 edition of the CFR for regulatory changes published in the FR during the remainder of 1943 and each calendar year through 1947. The wartime suspension of the first revision of the CFR was terminated in 1948 and the second edition of the CFR, recording regulations in effect on January 1, 1949, was issued.
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Following the 1949 edition of the CFR, "pocket supplements" were used to record regulatory changes 28 The term "pocket supplement" derives from pockets which were made in the books of the 1949 edition of the CFR for placement of the forthcoming supplements. 29 On several occasions, an "added pocket part" (APP) was published instead of a pocket supplement. The APP served as an addition or supplement to the previous year's pocket supplement. APPs were not cumulative unless they appeared in consecutive years, in which case the old APP was replaced by the current APP as a supplement to the most recent pocket supplement. 30 Beginning with the 1973 revision of the CFR, the effective revision date of each title varies within the year according to the following quarterly schedule: Titles 1-16 as of January 1; Titles 17-27 as of April 1; Titles 28-41 as of July 1; and Titles 42-50 as of October 1. 31 Recall from the discussion above that the timing of revisions to the 1949 edition of the CFR varies across titles between the years 1949 and 1969.
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published in the FR. 28 Pocket supplements differed from the annual supplements to the first edition of the CFR in that they were cumulative; that is, the pocket supplement for a given year recorded the full text of all changes to the 1949 CFR in effect at the end of the given year, irrespective of the year that the change occurred. The first pocket supplement covered changes during the June 2 to December 31, 1949 period and subsequent pocket supplements included any additional changes in effect at the end of each succeeding calendar year. So, for example, the 1950 pocket supplement documents changes to the 1949 edition of the CFR that occurred between June 2, 1949 and December 31, 1950. Some of those changes occurred between June 2 and December 31 of 1949 and so already were reported in the 1949 pocket supplement. The 1950 pocket supplement repeats them and adds all changes that occurred between January 1 and December 31 of 1950.
29
From time to time, as warranted by growth of the pocket supplements, individual titles (or individual parts of a title) of the 1949 CFR were revised. These revisions represented a complete codification of regulations in effect as of December 31 of the year in which they were published. The timing of revisions varied considerably across titles. In all titles, however, revisions became more frequent over time. In 1950, for instance, only Parts 71-90 of Title 49 (Transportation and Railroads) were revised. In 1960, all or parts of Titles 1-5, 14, 18-20, 26, 27, 32, 40, 41, 49 , and 50 were revised, and by 1968, all except Titles 34, 35, and 37 were revised. Beginning in 1969, all titles of the CFR have been revised annually. 
Measuring Regulatory Activity Using the CFR
The consistent codification of federal regulations in the CFR since its inception in 1938 provides a unique source of information on regulatory activity over the years. Dawson (2002) constructs series measuring regulatory activity based on the number of pages published in the CFR's various editions and supplements. Although the number of pages of regulation cannot capture the differential effects of alternative regulations on economic activity, it affords new information on the temporal behavior of the total amount of regulation in place. The remainder of this section provides a summary of these CFR-based measures of regulation. For a complete description of the methodology used to construct the series and a statistical comparison of the various series, see Dawson (2002) .
Before counting pages, we must standardize the pages in the CFR for different words per page across the years. That turns out to be almost effortless. The CFR uses the same font and page size in all years except the very first, 1938. We converted 1938 pages to "standard" pages simply by multiplying by an adjustment factor based on average words per page computed by sampling words per page in each title of the Code. Even this adjustment turns out to be irrelevant to our empirical work below because, for reasons to be explained momentarily, we started our sample period in 1949, thus omitting the non-standard 1938 edition of the Code entirely.
Measuring regulatory activity using data on the number of pages in the CFR is straightforward in years when the CFR is revised. These include the years 1938, 1949, all years after 1969, and some years between 1949 and 1969. 31 Estimating total pages of regulation during the periods between the 1938, 1949, and subsequent revisions is more problematic. One approach, which explicitly uses all annual and pocket supplement data to estimate total pages of regulation during years in which no revision is published, adds the number of pages in a nonrevision-year's supplement to the number of pages in its corresponding complete CFR. The series that results 32 Dawson (2002) discusses the "double-counting" problem in more detail and offers some alternative methods for constructing the regulatory series based on interpolation in the non-revision years. The results of the analysis in this paper are not sensitive to the construction method, thus we restrict attention to the series discussed here. 33 See Nicoletti et al. (2000) , , Djankov et al. (2002) , Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) , Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) , Loayza et al. (2004) , and Djankov et al. (2005) for detailed descriptions of these alternative measures.
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from this methodology exhibits rapid growth in pages of regulation during most of the 1940s followed by a drastic decline in 1949. This behavior in part may reflect the increase in regulation associated with World War II and the subsequent decrease following the war, but it also is likely to reflect in part an element of double counting that is, for practical purposes, unavoidable with the supplements used to codify regulatory changes between the 1938 and 1949 revisions of the CFR. The supplements print the entire text of any section of regulation that changed, even if only one word was different. Consequently, a page of text in a supplement may represent completely new text that was not present in 1938 or may be almost entirely repetition of previously existing text. The only way to avoid double counting repeated text would be to read each reported change to determine how much of it was repetition, an obviously impractical task. Growth in the estimated pages of regulation resumes in the early 1950s and moderates into the 1960s. The same double counting problem exists after 1949 as before but is less severe because revised volumes of the CFR were published intermittently between 1949 and 1969. The frequency of these intermittent updates increased as time passed, with almost the entire CFR being revised in 1968. Consequently, the growth in the CFR page count between 1949 and 1969 is much more likely to be a genuine phenomenon than is the pre-1949 growth. Double-counting ceases to be an issue after 1968 because the entire CFR is published every year after that. Because the counting problems are much more severe before 1949 than after, we restrict attention in our study to the period 1949-1999. 32 Also, because we are interested in the effects of regulation on the private economy, we exclude from our page count all regulations in the first six titles, which pertain to the internal organization and operation of the federal government itself.
Comparison with Other Measures of Regulation
3.1. Description. Our measure covers one country over 54 years; earlier measures cover many countries over much shorter periods of time. 33 Some of the earlier measures are purely cross-sectional, applying to a single year; others cover more years and so are panel data. The longest time span of the panel sets is 20 years.
Our measure is more comprehensive than any of its predecessors. Federal law requires that all federal regulations be published in the CFR, so our measure includes literally every regulation issued by the federal government. No other measure of regulation comes close to that extent of coverage. For example, the most widely used of the earlier data sets is the OECD cross-section measure described by and extended in part to a 20-year panel by . The cross-section data are restricted to product market and employment protection regulation; other types, such as environmental or occupational health and safety regulation, are ignored. The panel extension is restricted further to a small subset of seven non-manufacturing industries: gas, electricity, post, telecommunications, passenger air transport, railways and road freight. Types of regulations considered also are limited, with data availability varying by industry: barriers to entry (available for all industries), public ownership (all industries except road freight), vertical integration (gas, electricity and railways), market structure (gas, telecommunications and railways), and price controls (only road freight).
All measures of regulation including ours are aggregate indices. Our index is more highly aggregated than any of the others simply because it covers the full array of regulations, but all are aggregates. None simply reports a quantitative measure of the magnitude or effect of a single regulation. The OECD measure, for example, collects answers to about 1300 questions and combines them into an index through a multistep aggregation procedure. The methods of aggregation differ substantially across indices. Our method is to weight each regulation by its number of pages in the CFR, which captures at least partially the complexity of the regulation, as we discuss below. Many other indices are constructed as simple averages of basic data, with no attempt to weight by the importance or complexity of the regulations included. The OECD uses a multistep procedure, in which the OECD staff creates a 34 Similarly, Loyaza et al. (2005) found very high correlations among their 7 indices of regulation.
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collection of categorical sub-aggregates mostly as simple averages of basic data and then uses factor analysis to aggregate those into its final indices.
All measures except ours are based at least in part on survey data, typically obtained from questionnaires sent to government officials (OECD), market participants (Kaufman et al.) , and/or lawyers (Djankov, 2002) . Our measure is based solely on the page count of the CFR. 3.2. Evaluation. Our measure is a pure time series covering a long time span. The earlier measures of regulation have short to non-existent time spans, the longest being 20 years and the shortest 1 year. Such data cannot be used to study regulation's effects on macroeconomic dynamic adjustment paths, which requires following the evolution of variables through time. There is more hope of studying regulation's effects on average growth rates by using the cross-sectional dimension of the data to overcome the inadequate time dimension, which is precisely what several of the previous studies do. However, growth is an intertemporal phenomenon, so it would be useful to have time series estimates of regulation's effects on it, especially in light of Ventura's (1997) demonstration that the interpretation of cross-country growth regressions is confounded by the effects of foreign trade. Our measure, with its comparatively long time dimension, allows us to study both the long-run growth and short-run dynamic adjustment effects of regulation. The earlier studies, with their strong cross-section element but weak intertemporal element, are better suited for cross-sectional issues.
Our measure also is more comprehensive than the earlier measures, none of which encompasses the total set of regulations in any country. Incomplete coverage leads to two problems: (1) omitted variables bias, and, in any time series study, (2) divergence between the time series behavior of subsets of regulation on the one hand and of total regulation on the other. Table 1 shows that the page counts of the various titles of the CFR are highly correlated with one another, whether measured in levels or growth rates. The mean correlation among levels is 0.60, with an even higher median of 0.77. The maximum correlation in levels is 0.99, and the minimum correlation is -0.76. The correlations in growth rates are much lower, of course, with a mean of only 0.16 (median of 0.15), but there still are quite a few correlations of substantial magnitude, with the maximum and minimum being 0.74 and -0.63, respectively.
34 Such high correlations show that including just one type of regulation in a statistical analysis is likely to be misleading because of multicollinearity and consequent omitted variables problems. The problem is even more severe when addressing issues of macroeconomic dynamics. The correlations in Table 1 are all contemporaneous; for analyzing time series behavior, we also want to know the dynamic relations among various types of regulations. Grangercausality tests show the intertemporal dependence of one series on another after accounting for the first series's dependence on its own lagged values. Table 2 summarizes Granger-causality test results for two titles of the CFR related to the kinds of regulations studied in previous analyses-regulation of entry and regulation of labor markets. Title 16 of the CFR pertains to Commercial Practices, and Title 29 pertains to Labor. Table 2 shows that the page counts of those titles both Granger-cause and are Granger-caused by the page counts of other titles, some apparently quite unrelated in content to the subjects of titles 16 and 29. Similar results hold for most of the other titles of the CFR. These Granger-causality relations among CFR titles show that there are temporal orderings in the statistical relations among the types of regulation and provide strong evidence that a time series analysis restricted to a subset of regulations is likely to suffer from serious omitted variables bias.
The foregoing remarks have greatest force when applied to attempts to study the economic effects of a particular type of regulation. If one is interested in the impact of total regulation, the high correlations among the different types might actually be considered good news because they suggest that a subset of regulations may capture the behavior of the whole. Indeed, , who have perhaps the most restricted measure of all, interpret their indicators as "a proxy for the overall regulatory policies followed by OECD countries over the sample period (p. 43)."
Unfortunately, examination of the data shows this hope to be ill-founded. Nicoletti et al.'s (2001) measure spans 1978-98 and shows a 66% decline over that period. Subsets of CFR titles corresponding to Nicoletti et al.'s measure behave similarly. For example, titles 23 (Highways), 46 (Shipping), and 49 (Transportation) of the CFR encompass regulation of air transport, railways, and road freight, one Nicoletti et al.'s regulation groups. The page count of titles 23, 46, and 49 drops from a total of 8400 in 1978 to 8261 in 1998, which is qualitatively the same behavior as Nicoletti et al.'s measure. Nevertheless, the page count of the total CFR displays the opposite behavior,
